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Technological advances are bringing new light to privacy issues and changing the reasons 
for why privacy is important. These advances have changed not only the kind of personal 
data that is available to be collected, but also how that personal data can be used by those 
who have access to it. We are particularly concerned with how information about personal 
attributes inferred from collected data (such as online behaviour), can be used to tailor 
messages and services to specific individuals or groups. This kind of ‘personalised 
targeting’ has the potential to influence individuals’ perceptions, attitudes, and choices 
in unprecedented ways. In this paper, we argue that because it is becoming easier for 
companies to use collected data for influence, threats to privacy are increasingly also 
threats to personal autonomy—an individual’s ability to reflect on and decide freely about 
their values, actions, and behaviour, and to act on those choices.1 While increasing 
attention is directed to the ethics of how personal data is collected, we make the case that 
a new ethics of privacy needs to also think more rigorously about how personal data may 
be used, and its potential impact on personal autonomy. 
We begin by briefly reviewing existing work on the value of privacy and its link to 
autonomy, before outlining how recent technological advances are changing this 
relationship by changing the ways that personal information can be used to influence 
behaviour. We introduce the idea of ‘personalised targeting’, and discuss its implications 
for autonomy, before finally presenting some considerations for determining when this 
kind of targeting is acceptable and when it is not. Finally, we conclude with some practical 
implications for thinking about the ethics of how data is used. 
 
Other authors in this project have considered the value of privacy in more detail, so here 
we just briefly discuss the historical link between privacy and personal autonomy. While 
a few thinkers have suggested that privacy may have intrinsic value (e.g., Fried 1970; 
Moor 1990), most discussions focus at least partially on the instrumental value of privacy 
for protecting other goods such as autonomy, dignity, fairness, reputation, self-
development, intimacy, and bodily integrity (for overviews, see Solove 2006, 2008). While 
we think that all of these links are important, here we focus on autonomy, which we 
believe has a particularly important connection to privacy today. 
The basic intuition behind the idea that privacy and autonomy are connected is as 
follows. One natural reason why a person might care about threats to their privacy is that 
                                                                
1 This definition is meant to capture some consensus around the notion of ‘autonomy’, although there continue 
to be disagreements amongst political philosophers on how best to characterize the notion. See Bernal (2014), 
Raz (1986), Rawls (1999), and Macnish (2019) for further discussions.  
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if others have access to personal information about them, others can use that information 
to influence them. If such influence is exerted in covert or manipulative ways, this could 
especially threaten a person’s ability to make independent decisions and form 
independent beliefs or values. 
One of the earliest accounts of a ‘right to privacy’, proposed by Warren and Brandeis 
(1890), came as a response to the nascent inventions of photography and newspapers at 
the time, which introduced new threats to an important right they termed ‘the right to be 
let alone’. The protection from scrutiny, interruption, and criticism that solitude provides 
is important for autonomous decision-making. Even this early defence of privacy 
provides some link to personal autonomy, if only implicitly. Since then, however, others 
have argued more explicitly for this connection.   
On one view, exercising autonomy requires being able to detach from the influences that 
come from social and political spheres. Westin (1967), for example, argues that the right 
to privacy protects individual autonomy from interference and influence by society and 
the state by carving out a protective space for the individual to reflect and act freely. A 
similar case has been made by other thinkers: Benn (1984), Johnson (1985), and Kupfer 
(1987) all argue along similar lines that privacy supports personal autonomy. In 
particular, Kupfer contends that privacy is essential for ‘the development of an 
autonomous self’. For instance, the total loss of privacy in most prisons causes inmates 
to suffer from a shrunken individual ‘self-concept’ and, as a result, to suffer from 
diminished autonomy (Kupfer 1987: 83).2 To be free to self-determine and maintain a 
robust ‘self-concept’, therefore, individuals need to be able to retain some control over 
what information about them is accessible to other people.  
While the link between privacy and autonomy has been acknowledged in some academic 
literature on internet privacy (e.g., Bernal 2014), this relationship has rarely been 
emphasised in more contemporary policy discussions around digital privacy. The most 
recent report from the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) on personal 
information and political influence, for example, never once mentions autonomy (ICO 
2018). In this paper we argue that as technological advances make it easier than ever for 
personal information to be used to influence people in manipulative ways, the link 
between privacy and autonomy is stronger than ever and deserving of more attention. We 
begin by outlining in more detail some of the key relevant technological advances around 
the collection, access, and use of personal data. 
                                                                
2 Jeremy Bentham (1995) makes a similar case with his example of the hypothetical ‘Panopticon’, a prison with 
extreme surveillance that, so he argued, had the effect of reducing individual autonomy. 
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While the values of privacy and autonomy have always been interconnected, 
technological advances have made this link stronger than ever, as we are seeing changes 
in: (i) the type and amount of personal data that can be collected; (ii) who holds and has 
access to that data; and, perhaps most importantly, (iii) how that data can be used by 
those who can access it. In this section we review some of the key technological advances 
in recent years that are relevant to privacy and autonomy. 
(i) Data collection: It is now possible for companies to collect vastly more data about 
people’s lives than ever. A wealth of data about our online behaviour can be accessed (and 
is sometimes owned) by tech companies. Such data includes web browsing logs, search 
engine activity, and our social media networks and activity. Much of this data may not be 
legally considered ‘personal data’ or at least is not given the strongest legal protections,3 
though with machine learning methods it is possible to draw highly personal inferences 
from it. As such we will use the term ‘personally relevant data’ to refer to data that is 
either legally considered to be personal data under the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) or data that could be used (with the right techniques) to 
draw inferences about a particular human user’s personal attributes. For example, age 
and gender can be predicted with relatively high accuracy from people’s web browsing 
logs (Hu et al. 2007). Facebook ‘likes’ can be used to predict gender, sexual orientation, 
religious beliefs, and ethnicity with high accuracy, and to predict personality variables 
with reasonable reliability (Kosinski et al. 2012). What counts as personally relevant data 
is therefore meant to be quite broad—it covers all the kinds of trackable online activity 
mentioned, but it could also include biometric information gathered from wearables, 
location information from GPS-enabled devices, and even information held by the state 
such as health care records, income, and tax information. 4 
(ii) Data storage and access: Personally relevant data from smartphones and smart 
devices largely sits in the hands of a few powerful tech companies, such as Google and 
Facebook. As individuals conduct more of their activities online, from the things they buy 
to daily interactions with friends and colleagues, these companies are accumulating vast 
amounts of information about our day-to-day lives. Access to this personal data can also 
be bought and sold by different private companies, without the knowledge, much less the 
consent, of those individuals whom the data concerns. This leads to a highly asymmetric 
situation: tech companies hold an enormous amount of information about their users, 
information that they may not even know themselves, while at the same time users know 
                                                                
3 At least not in the EU, under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR); see Wachter and Mittelstadt 
(Forthcoming). 
4 We use this definition, rather than the definition of personal data under the GDPR or other legislation, in 
recognition that what is legally considered to be ‘personal data’ can change as either the law or technology changes 
(for example, advances in machine learning enabling us to draw increasingly personal inferences from data that 
was not previously considered to be ‘personal’) 
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very little about these companies and how they work. This asymmetry gives large tech 
companies substantial power over individuals. While asymmetric power relations have 
always existed between individuals and their governments, for example, the power that 
tech companies have acquired through their access to data is a cause for concern. Though 
not without their own problems, democratic governments are at least elected by citizens, 
meaning they are subject to more public accountability than private companies. The 
high-level objectives of our government are also typically more aligned with public 
interests than the objectives of a private company might be. 
(iii) Data use: A large part of what makes this data so valuable to companies is that it can 
be used to ‘target’ the delivery of various products, services, and messages to specific 
users and demographics, allowing companies to better achieve whatever their business 
aims are. Targeting is the process of selecting a specific group of people and tailoring 
messages or services based on the characteristics of that group, as a strategy for more 
effective campaigns. For example, Facebook adverts and Amazon product suggestions are 
tailored to the user using an algorithm that takes into account various sources of 
information, such as past buying behaviour or demographic group. While the question of 
what will be effective for different types of people has long been integral to any product 
development or marketing strategy, technological advances are changing the kind of 
targeting that is possible, making it easier to target groups and individuals. 
The process of selecting a specified group is essential for effective targeting. Different 
products and different types of messaging will appeal to different groups of people—for 
example, middle-aged women are more likely than teenagers or most men to be 
interested in anti-ageing cream, and a person’s political persuasion may have a 
significant impact on what kinds of news sources they read. The more information is 
available about a person’s demographic and interests, the easier it is to target messages 
and services with personalised content to be maximally effective. Through the collection 
of increasingly personal data described in (i), companies can learn more about their 
consumers than ever before, making their targeting methods more narrow and 
personalised. In the future, we may see companies use increasingly sophisticated 
techniques to make inferences that can inform their targeting efforts—inferring personal 
characteristics such as personality traits, interests, or health conditions, for example, and 
using those characteristics to predict or influence future behaviour. 
As well as making targeting efforts more personalised, technological advances allow 
targeting to be made both more pervasive and more covert. Because most people carry 
smartphones and access websites individually (as opposed to, say, how families used to 
consume television together), companies have unprecedented access to data on an 
individual level. Individualised data allows companies to customize the means of their 
interventions: they can pay for ads on the websites a specific user visits, on the social 
media feeds they frequent the most, and even geo-target ads based on their current 
physical location. This means that individuals may be subject to some form of targeting 
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from companies in a large proportion of their daily lives, while being completely unaware 
that this is happening most of the time. 
 
(i) What is personalised targeting? 
We refer to the entire process of using personally relevant data to customize both the 
content and the means of interventions as ‘personalised targeting’ (others have used the 
label ‘behavioral micro-targeting’, e.g,. Ward 2018). In this section we outline in more 
detail what we mean by personalised targeting, how it can be used, and why it is a threat 
to autonomy. 
The ability to use data to target individuals in different ways distinguishes personalised 
targeting from the kind of broad targeting of populations that has been used for years, 
such as running advertisements for children’s toys during cartoon shows. Modern 
personalised targeting is also unique in its potential to use and adapt to real-time data. 
As mentioned, companies can already geo-target ads based on a person’s current 
location, and in the near future, it may even be possible to assess mood and emotions in 
real-time from users’ online communication (using machine learning to predict mood 
from language use) and heart-rate monitoring on wearable devices.5  
How effective is this kind of personalised targeting at actually influencing individual 
behaviour? The evidence is currently mixed, depending on the type of data being used 
and the aims of targeting. Some evidence suggests that consumer behaviour is more 
effectively influenced when campaigns are tailored to individuals’ personal 
characteristics (Matz et al. 2017; Goldfarb 2014; Noar et al. 2007), but no direct evidence 
exists yet that tailoring based on features such as personality type can be effective in 
changing users’ political attitudes or voting behaviour (Resnick 2018). However, it is clear 
that companies, and even governments, are attempting to influence behaviour in 
increasingly personalised ways, and as data availability and modelling techniques 
improve, it is reasonable to expect that personalised targeting will become more effective. 
(ii) Why personalised targeting matters for autonomy 
The increased use of personalised targeting by companies to deliver messages and 
services is not all bad, of course, and others have emphasised the potential benefits for 
both companies and consumers: how online stores can be better designed to fit the user’s 
inferred profile, and how marketing and product recommendations could be improved 
                                                                
5 A particularly relevant field of study is affective computing which, among other things, aims to develop ways 
to recognize and influence human emotions through digital devices and data. For more detail see Calvo et al. 
2015. 
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with a better understanding of individuals’ attributes and preferences (Kosinski et al. 
2012). However, the recent scandal involving Cambridge Analytica, who allegedly used 
personality traits inferred from Facebook ‘Likes’ to target political campaigns 
(Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018), demonstrates the potential for personalised 
targeting to be used to influence behaviour in ways harmful to individuals and society.6 
Efforts by companies and governments to shape the beliefs and behaviour of the general 
public are certainly not a new phenomenon. As mentioned before, marketers have long 
been using the practice of ‘segmenting’ audiences, tailoring campaigns to make them 
maximally persuasive to different groups or demographics. In recent years, governments 
and companies have also begun using insights from behavioural science to more 
effectively influence citizen and customer behaviour. Based on ‘nudge theory’, these 
relatively new methods of influencing behaviour rely on the idea that decision-making is 
easily influenced by environmental factors, or changes in our ‘choice architecture’ 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2009). ‘Nudges’ attempt to trigger automatic cognitive processes 
(rather than reflective or deliberate ones), in order to increase the likelihood that an 
individual will make a certain choice—making healthier options more salient or easier to 
reach in a canteen, for example.  
What makes personalised targeting a particular threat to autonomy, compared to other 
attempts to influence or ‘nudge’ behaviour? We argue that it is because personalised 
targeting is particularly likely to be manipulative. Here we follow Susser et al. (2018), who 
define manipulation as any attempt to influence others’ behaviour that is hidden and 
subverts an individual’s ability to act on their own reasons. On this definition, 
manipulation contrasts with attempts to persuade which appeal openly to a person’s 
capacity for conscious deliberation and choice, and therefore are consistent with personal 
autonomy. The difference between manipulation and persuasion is not necessarily a clear 
cut one, but rather a spectrum, depending on the extent to which the attempt to influence 
undermines an individual’s ability to act on their own reasons. 
Personalised targeting differs from traditional marketing and nudging in a few key ways 
that make it more likely to be manipulative, and therefore more threatening to autonomy. 
First, the kind of personalised targeting that is possible today is becoming increasingly 
‘hidden’ from view. This is partly because attempts to influence behaviour are simply 
more pervasive in our lives: an increasing number of our choices and behaviours are 
conducted through interactions with digital technologies. We may be so often subject to 
attempts to influence our decisions and behaviour that we cannot possibly be alert to 
each attempt. In addition, because of the information asymmetry between technology 
companies and their users, in most cases an individual cannot even know what 
                                                                
6 Despite mixed evidence about how effective their techniques were, many consider the attempt to manipulate 
voting behaviour itself to be a threat to autonomy, e.g., Ward 2018; Zunger 2018.  
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information a company has about them, let alone how or when that information is being 
used.  
Second, the highly personalised nature of modern targeting also makes it a bigger threat 
to autonomy. Susser et al. (2018) suggest that while mass manipulation is certainly 
possible, we ought to worry more about manipulation the more targeted it is—in part 
simply because the more personalised an attempt at influence is, the more likely it is to 
be effective. But an additional reason why personalisation may be especially worrying is 
that personalised attempts to persuade are more likely to be deceptive, which Goodin 
(1980) suggests is key to manipulation. If a company is attempting to persuade a large, 
diverse group of people to vote for a certain political candidate, they will to have to use a 
strategy that will appeal widely, highlighting many of the candidate’s different policies 
and strengths. But if the objective is to appeal to a specific individual, and the company 
has information on that person’s characteristics and interests, a more effective approach 
might be to just emphasise those policies that are most likely to appeal to that person. If 
the targeted person is not made aware that this information has been personalised to 
them, they may assume they are seeing a much more representative picture of the 
candidate than they in fact are. In an extreme scenario, a candidate could even 
deliberately mislead voters by presenting herself as in favour of gun control to one group 
of people, for example, and as against it to another group. As personalised targeting 
increases companies’ ability to restrict or misrepresent the information and options 
available to them, it therefore increases the threat to individuals’ ability to decide and act 
freely i.e. their autonomy.  
Finally, personalised targeting methods are largely being used by powerful technology 
companies whose goals are not necessarily aligned with the well-being of individual 
users. Even if companies such as Facebook do not intend to influence their users in 
harmful ways, they may inadvertently do so simply because the company’s objective does 
not align with individual users’ well-being. Facebook’s aim is to increase users’ 
engagement with the site. By tailoring a user’s experience of the site to optimise that aim, 
the company is automatically trying to influence users to do what Facebook wants rather 
than allowing them the autonomy to choose what is best for themselves (which may well 
be to stop scrolling through their newsfeed.) Powerful technology companies such as 
Google and Facebook also have the power to shape more than just people’s purchases, 
but also their most fundamental beliefs—about politics, morality, and the reality of what 
others around them do and think. This presents a much more severe threat to individual 
autonomy, as these attitudes are arguably much more central to who one is as a person 
than consumer decisions. 
To sum up: while individuals, companies and governments have always attempted to 
influence others, modern personalised targeting makes these attempts more covert, 
widespread and deceptive, and generally less aligned with public interests. All of this 
brings new urgency to familiar concerns about the ethics of influence and manipulation 
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(Sunstein, 2016), raising new questions about the use of highly personal data in attempts 
to influence behaviour. When and how is it acceptable to use information about personal 
attributes (inferred or otherwise) to target adverts, messages, and interventions at 
specific groups or individuals in order to influence their attitudes and behaviour? And 
how do we ensure that individual autonomy is protected as the amount and kinds of 
personal data that are available increases? 
This section introduces some of the factors that we suggest are most important when 
considering what should count as an ethical use of targeting, building on what has been 
written about the ethics and public acceptability of nudging (Selinger and Whyte 2011; 
Sunstein 2015, 2016; Petrescu et al. 2016). 
Some cases of personalised targeting, such as the targeted political campaigns Cambridge 
Analytica has been accused of engaging in, have been called out by many as highly 
unethical, both in the ways described above and in threatening the democratic process 
(e.g., Ward 2018; Zunger 2018). 7  On the other hand, it does seem possible that 
personalised targeting can be used for good: imagine a hypothetical medical startup 
which consensually uses data about individuals’ personal medical histories to tailor 
interventions to be maximally effective. 
In some sense, Cambridge Analytica and the hypothetical medical startup are engaged in 
similar practices: both are using personal information to target the ‘service’ they provide 
in order to be more effective. Many cases of targeting, both real and hypothetical, will lie 
somewhere in between these two ends of the spectrum and raise more nuanced ethical 
questions. What about a government using inferences about personal attributes to deliver 
personalised tax reminder messages, increasing the likelihood that people will pay their 
taxes on time? Or targeted advertising based on segmenting populations by demographic 
factors such as gender, class, or educational background? How do we draw the line 
between where targeting seems to yield clear benefits and where it looks like outright 
manipulation? What factors—such as the kind of data being used, the level of 
transparency, or the purpose of the targeting—make the difference?  
The following are some considerations that seem important in distinguishing between 
ethical and unethical forms of targeting.  
 
                                                                
7 Indeed, there are also important social consequences of personalised targeting, such as threats to democratic 
processes, fairness, and social equality, but this paper focuses on the negative consequences for the individual 
rather than for society. 
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(i) Personalised targeting should be consistent with people’s values and interests.  
First, the objective of the targeting is clearly important. A company might be trying to 
change people’s preferences or behaviour to suit the company’s own objectives—say, to 
get people to vote for a given political party or increase their use of a social media 
platform, say. Contrast this with a case in which targeting instead aims to better serve 
existing preferences, such as providing targeted ‘nudges’ to someone who has purchased 
a FitBit to help them walk more. A useful question to ask here is the following: to what 
extent are the interests of the ‘targeter’ aligned with those of the person being targeted? 
(ii) Personalised targeting should be transparent. 
A second important factor is how transparent it is to users that targeting is taking place, 
and what kinds of information are being used for this targeting. Most people are aware 
that advertisers are giving them personalised content, but may well assume they are 
seeing the same political campaigns or news articles as everyone else. In most cases 
people also have no awareness of what assumptions about them are being used in 
targeting: whether the adverts or campaigns they are seeing are tailored based on their 
gender, ethnicity, interests, or location for example. When people are aware that they are 
seeing personalised content, such as in the case of product advertising, they can (a) take 
this into account when making decisions based on the content they see (recognising that 
it may not be fully neutral or objective), and (b) have at least some recourse to challenge 
or change the way such targeting is being done. Both remedies rely on transparency to 
help people preserve their autonomy.  
(iii) Companies should attempt to seek consent.  
Related to the issue of transparency is whether people are given an opportunity to 
consent to how their data is being used for targeting. Ideally, consent should have been 
obtained for both (i) what personally relevant data is collected and (ii) how that data is 
used in personalised targeting. In the case of the medical startup, we can assume that a 
patient’s individual medical history was given to the startup with that person’s consent 
and an understanding of how it would be used. This is starkly different from how 
Cambridge Analytica collected and used personally relevant data in the form of Facebook 
‘Likes’. Gaining consent can be challenging in practice, however. As many Europeans 
have experienced since the implementation of the GDPR in 2018, for example, abundant 
notifications about the use of cookies can easily become a burden for the user (Schofield 
2018; Degeling et al. 2018). More research is needed to develop practical methods of 
gaining consent, given its importance in preserving users’ autonomy. One option, already 
included in the GDPR, is to require that users be able to easily (e.g., with just a few clicks) 
opt out of the collection of their data at any time.  It would also be desirable for them to 
be able to withdraw consent for certain uses of their data.  
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(iv) Personalised targeting should not attempt to restrict information or choices in 
a way that misrepresents reality. 
Personalised targeting can misrepresent reality in two ways: it may restrict what 
information people are aware of, or it may restrict the choices that are made available to 
them, each undermining different aspects of autonomy. It may be impossible to present 
someone with all possible information or choices without overwhelming them, and so 
focusing on what is most relevant does not necessarily restrict autonomy. One important 
question in this context is: how would information or options be presented in the absence 
of personally relevant information? The more personalised targeting departs from this 
‘default’, the more it risks limiting individuals’ ability to choose and act freely, and 
therefore should be held to a higher standard of justification. 
(v) Personalised targeting should not make use of certain kinds of personally 
relevant data. 
Some types of personally relevant data are more sensitive than others, and there may be 
certain information that we want to deem strictly unacceptable to exploit for the 
purposes of targeting. For instance, targeting individuals from minority ethnic groups 
with ads for alcohol or tobacco products because those groups have higher consumption 
rates seems clearly problematic (e.g., Moore et al. 1996). Likewise, using information 
about vulnerabilities—for example, inferring that someone suffers from depression or 
anxiety, and using this to target persuasion attempts at those vulnerabilities seems 
particularly unacceptable. There can be exceptions: if information about vulnerabilities 
is relevant to identifying those who would most benefit from a certain kind of support, 
for example. In these cases, ensuring the person can consent is particularly important. 
This brings us back to the importance of considering to what extent the objective of 
targeting is aligned with the individual’s own interests. But to the extent that personally 
relevant data is used to exploit vulnerabilities, the use of this data is particularly 
problematic. Of course, determining what counts as a vulnerability in practice will be 
challenging, and much more work is needed to draw meaningful and useful lines here. 
There are a number of additional questions we might ask about what kinds of attributes 
it is acceptable to use for targeting. Is narrower targeting—that is, on the level of 
individual characteristics rather than group attributes—more ethically problematic? Is it 
more acceptable to use attributes that are relevant to the purpose of targeting? Are there 
some types of personally-relevant information that should always be off-limits for the 
purposes of targeting? 
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This paper contends that now, more than ever, forsaking our privacy threatens individual 
autonomy. Technological advances in how personally relevant data can be collected and 
accessed, enable companies and other organisations to influence individuals behaviour 
in highly targeted ways. It is this process of personalised targeting that raises new threats 
to autonomy, especially as it is deployed by technology companies whose goals are not 
necessarily aligned with individuals’ well-being.  
What does all of this mean for how society thinks about privacy? The contention of this 
paper is that there is now a need for the ethics of privacy to reevaluate how personal data 
can be used to undermine individual autonomy, and to take this into account in 
determining how the collection and use of personally relevant data ought to be governed. 
As Wachter and Mittelstadt (Forthcoming) point out, for example, some of the 
information that can be inferred from data about online behaviour can pertain to highly 
sensitive attributes, but is not currently protected by the law to any serious degree. 
Especially given how these inferences about personal attributes might be used for 
influence, there may be a strong case for changing the governance of such information. 
In this paper, we have outlined five relevant factors that an ethics of personalised 
targeting must consider in order to better protect people’s autonomy: (1) to what extent 
the objectives of the targeting effort align with the individual’s own values and interests, 
(2) how transparent the targeting effort is, (3) whether the individual has given consent 
for their data to be collected and used for the purposes of targeting, (4) whether the form 
of targeting makes a fair attempt to accurately represent reality, and, finally, (5) whether 
certain sensitive, vulnerable information about an individual has been used.  
The last two considerations are especially distinctive to new forms of personalised 
targeting,8 and so particularly warrant further exploration, perhaps using different case 
studies to delineate key ethical considerations. In particular, we need better answers to 
the following questions: (a) what counts as making a fair attempt to ‘accurately represent 
reality’ in personalised targeting?, and (b) what kinds of sensitive information should be 
considered off-limits for the purposes of targeting, and in what contexts?  
We urge both policymakers and researchers to take the ethics of personalised targeting 
seriously in discussions of privacy, and to consider how existing regulation or new 
governance approaches might be used to protect individual autonomy. Considerations 
about how data may be used, and the ethical consequences of that use, need to be a part 
of the larger analysis of what data it is acceptable for companies and others to acquire. 
 
                                                                
8 Versions of our first three principles also appear in Sunstein’s (2015) work on the ethics of nudging. 
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